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CANCER ALLEY AND THE FIGHT AGAINST
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO CANCER ALLEY
“Cancer Alley,” also known as “Petrochemical America,” is an
area along the Mississippi River spanning from Baton Rouge to New
Orleans, Louisiana.1  Cancer Alley houses over 150 petrochemical
plants and refineries.2  Petrochemical companies use these plants
to refine “crude oil . . . into a variety of petrochemicals” that are
then used to produce everything from construction materials to
clothing.3  The most common petrochemical product is plastic.4
The media and local inhabitants dubbed the region “Cancer
Alley” after noticing that many residents were dying after develop-
ing different types of cancer.5  In Cancer Alley, approximately forty-
six individuals per one million are at risk of developing cancer,
compared with the national average of roughly thirty individuals
per one million.6  Louisiana is attractive to petrochemical compa-
nies because it has one of the largest concentrations of oil and natu-
ral gas in the Western Hemisphere.7  Consequently, Louisiana has
the highest concentration of petrochemical facilities in the Western
1. Courtney J. Keehan, Note & Comment, Lessons from Cancer Alley: How the
Clean Air Act Has Failed to Protect Public Health in Southern Louisiana, 29 COLO. NAT.
RES. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 341, 341 (2018) (providing description of Cancer
Alley).  Cancer Alley spans “an eighty-five mile stretch of land” along the Louisiana
portion of the Mississippi River. Id. (describing geography of Cancer Alley
region).
2. Id. (noting large number of petrochemical plants in Cancer Alley).
3. Id. at 347 (describing petrochemical industry).  Some of the most famous
petrochemical companies with plants in the area are Chevron, DuPont, Exxon Mo-
bil, and Shell, among others. Id. (recounting companies with plants located in
Cancer Alley).  Additional products derived from petrochemicals are “acetone . . .
plexiglass, antifreeze, medication for swimmer’s ear, [and] plastic furniture . . . .”
Id. at 348 (listing products made from petrochemicals).
4. See Beth Gardiner, The Plastics Pipeline: A Surge of New Production Is on the
Way, YALE ENV’T 360 (Dec. 19, 2019), https://e360.yale.edu/features/the-plastics-
pipeline-a-surge-of-new-production-is-on-the-way (predicting plastic production
will account for half of “oil demand growth” by 2050).
5. Keehan, supra note 1, at 344 (recounting significant number of cancer
cases and death in area).
6. Wesley James ET AL., Uneven Magnitude of Disparities in Cancer Risk from Air
Toxics, 9 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 4365, 4369 (2012) (comparing aver-
age rates of cancer risk in Cancer Alley, Louisiana, and rest of United States).
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Hemisphere, and in 2018 had the sixth-highest cancer mortality
rate in the United States.8
Most of Cancer Alley’s residents are impoverished African
Americans who live near, or next to, petrochemical plants.9  This is
no coincidence.10  There is little evidence that communities of
color move to sites where toxic waste facilities and landfills are lo-
cated.11  Rather, toxic waste sites are often sited in primarily poor
and African American neighborhoods, which suggests “[w]hen tak-
ing out the factor of income, race is the single most significant indi-
cator of where toxic waste or pollutant sites are located.”12  This
phenomenon has led to accusations of “environmental racism” and
calls for “environmental justice.”13  Environmental racism refers to
a society unduly burdening people of color with the risks and harm-
ful effects of environmental policies that otherwise benefit the rest
of society.14
Petrochemical companies intentionally place their facilities in
towns with established poor communities of color, meaning that
“toxicity follows poor, segregated communities, not the other way
around.”15  There are various reasons why Cancer Alley exists and
why communities of color are disproportionately affected by pollu-
tion when compared with white communities.16  Some of these rea-
sons include Jim Crow laws, zoning laws and siting processes, and
the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) unequal enforce-
ment of federal environmental laws based on the race of the popu-
lation impacted.17  Additionally, the “Not In My Back Yard”
8. Id. (connecting large number of petrochemical plants with high incidence
of cancer); see also Cancer Mortality by State, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/press-
room/sosmap/cancer_mortality/cancer.htm (last visited June 13, 2020) (ranking
states by highest cancer rates).
9. See Julia Mizutani, Note, In the Backyard of Segregated Neighborhoods: An Envi-
ronmental Justice Case Study of Louisiana, 31 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 363, 364, 372-74
(2019) (noting most toxic wastes sites are located in poor, African American
neighborhoods).
10. See generally id. at 364 (insinuating location of toxic waste sites is not
random).
11. Id. 364-65 (discussing unlikelihood of minorities moving to polluted
sites).
12. Id. at 364 (describing location of waste sites).
13. Id. at 365 (stating environmental justice movement seeks to right wrongs
perpetrated by environmental racism).
14. Maria Ramirez Fisher, Comment, On the Road from Environmental Racism to
Environmental Justice, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 449, 449-50 (1994) (defining environmen-
tal racism and noting burdens placed on people of color).
15. Mizutani, supra note 9, at 365 (pointing to how petrochemical companies
decide where to place toxic waste facilities).
16. See id. at 390 (suggesting possible reasons for Cancer Alley’s existence).
17. See id. at 370, 390 (listing possible reasons behind environmental racism).
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(NIMBY) movement and white flight have affected how pe-
trochemical companies and zoning boards decide where to locate
petrochemical facilities.18
As citizens in primarily white neighborhoods started mounting
successful opposition campaigns against the siting of petrochemical
plants in their communities, these facilities were increasingly relo-
cated to communities of color.19  Petrochemical companies chose
to build in communities of color, as residents were often in need of
jobs and politically vulnerable due to a lack of support from local
government or access to resources.20  Although people of color
have mobilized to fight the siting of toxic waste facilities since the
1990s, their success has been limited.21
The limited success that people of color throughout the
United States have had in challenging siting decisions explains why
many petrochemical companies choose to locate their facilities in
Cancer Alley.22  Most Cancer Alley residents are impoverished Afri-
can Americans who are unable to afford legal representation to as-
sist them in challenging siting decisions, thus ensuring the siting of
toxic waste facilities goes unchallenged.23  Unlike the Cancer Alley
communities, predominantly wealthy and white neighborhoods are
often represented on local zoning boards and can fight the siting of
toxic waste facilities near their neighborhoods through
NIMBYism.24
The NIMBY movement grew in the 1970s as the public became
aware of the health risks associated with hazardous waste facilities.25
18. See Robin Saha & Paul Mohai, Historical Context and Hazardous Waste Facility
Siting: Understanding Temporal Patterns in Michigan, 52 SOC. PROBLEMS 618, 638
(2005) (examining siting practices in Michigan and rest of United States).  The
siting of hazardous waste facilities in Michigan in residential areas with aging and
deteriorating housing coupled with white flight has led to the concentration of
poor people of color in such areas. Id. (noting communities could become signifi-
cantly vulnerable to siting of new hazardous waste facilities).
19. See id. at 623 (explaining growth of NIMBY movement).
20. Id. (listing reasons why petrochemical companies place facilities in poor
communities of color).
21. Id. at 624 (noting people of color’s limited success in challenging siting
decisions).
22. See Mizutani, supra note 9, at 370 (illustrating companies’ desire to avoid
challenges and resulting delays).
23. See id. (identifying poor minority communities as path of least resistance,
leading to toxic waste facilities being placed there).
24. Id. (showing disparate treatment between white and African American
communities in Louisiana).
25. See David Schelly & Paul B. Stretesky, An Analysis of the “Path of Least Resis-
tance” Argument in Three Environmental Justice Success Cases, 22 SOC’Y & NAT. RE-
SOURCES 369, 370 (2009) (discussing origins of NIMBY movement).
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As wealthy and white communities increased their opposition to fa-
cility siting, the industry had to change its tactics on the “spatial
distribution of environmental hazards.”26  This is because affluent
communities are often able to “leverage their economic and politi-
cal clout” to deflect unwanted facilities from their neighbor-
hoods.27  Accordingly, petrochemical companies began placing
their toxic waste facilities near poor African American neighbor-
hoods to avoid any further delays or expenses associated with trying
to place a facility in a wealthy white neighborhood.28
This Comment discusses the events that led to the existence of
Cancer Alley as well as the environmental racism Cancer Alley re-
sidents suffer.29  Section II discusses the siting of petrochemical
plants in Cancer Alley.30  Section III analyzes how the EPA’s regula-
tions and the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality’s
(LDEQ) lack of enforcement of environmental laws fail to protect
Cancer Alley’s most vulnerable citizens.31  Section III also briefly
considers President Clinton’s Executive Order on environmental
justice and the proposed Environmental Justice Act.32  Section IV
then examines the difficulty of obtaining legal representation in
Cancer Alley and the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic contro-
versy.33  Finally, Section V explores the continued fight of Cancer
Alley’s residents against the construction of more petrochemical
26. Id. (stating opposition from wealthy and white communities led to target-
ing of poor and minority communities for facility siting).
27. Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Blackmail in Minority Communities, in RE-
FLECTING ON NATURE: READINGS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 132, 134 (Lori
Gruen & Dale Jamieson eds., 1994) (noting affluent communities are more vocal
and successful in opposing hazardous waste facility siting).  Groups opposing the
siting of hazardous waste facilities began demanding that they be placed else-
where, which often led to facilities being placed in disadvantaged communities of
color. Id. (stating placement of unequal environmental burdens on poor and mi-
nority communities has “engendered feelings” of disparate treatment).
28. Mizutani, supra note 9, at 370 (describing how companies place toxic
waste sites where they will not be met with resistance).
29. See generally id. at 365 (discussing link between racism and environmental
injustice).
30. For a further discussion of siting decisions in Louisiana and Cancer Alley,
see infra notes 35-78 and accompanying text.
31. For a further discussion of the EPA’s and LDEQ’s failure to protect Can-
cer Alley’s residents, see infra notes 79-178 and accompanying text.
32. For a further discussion of the proposed Environmental Justice Act, see
infra notes 179-88 and accompanying text.
33. For a further discussion of the difficulty of obtaining legal representation
to litigate environmental issues in Cancer Alley, as well as the unsuccessful attempt
to close the TELC, see infra notes 189-226 and accompanying text.
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plants and the revitalization of the environmental justice
movement.34
II. SITING OF PETROCHEMICAL PLANTS
Cancer Alley’s sad history foreshadowed the struggles its future
inhabitants would face.35  The population’s history, the legacy of
Jim Crow laws, and parish governance in Louisiana signaled the en-
vironmental injustices Cancer Alley residents would suffer.36  More-
over, Louisiana’s “racial geography” and its practice of redlining
further exposed Cancer Alley residents to environmental hazards
that worsened their health.37
A. Louisiana and Cancer Alley’s History
Before becoming an industrialized region, Cancer Alley was
composed of “sugar, indigo, and cotton” plantations that were built
by slave labor.38  After the American Civil War and the issuance of
the Emancipation Proclamation, many former slaves remained
close to the plantations where they had been enslaved.39  These for-
mer slaves founded the unincorporated communities that now
make up Cancer Alley.40  Former slaves established homes in these
unincorporated communities, which have been passed down
through generations to some of Cancer Alley’s current residents.41
Recently, Formosa Plastics Group (Formosa) discovered un-
marked slave burial grounds on the site of its proposed industrial
complex, known as the Sunshine Project, in St. James Parish.42  Par-
34. For a further discussion of the ongoing fight against environmental ra-
cism and the siting of petrochemical facilities in Cancer Alley, see infra notes 227-
50 and accompanying text.
35. See Mizutani, supra note 9, at 364-65 (discussing how Cancer Alley came to
be).
36. See id. at 365, 373 (highlighting Cancer Alley’s history of segregated
communities).
37. See id. at 365, 374-75 (discussing intersectionality between segregation and
environmental racism).
38. Keehan, supra note 1, at 345 (describing Cancer Alley’s landscape pre-
Civil War).
39. Id. at 346 (discussing Cancer Alley’s history of slavery).
40. Mizutani, supra note 9, at 373 (noting history behind Cancer Alley’s unin-
corporated communities).
41. Keehan, supra note 1, at 346 (describing ownership of land in Cancer
Alley).
42. Alex Lubben, ‘Cancer Alley’ Residents Are Trying to Stop a Huge Plastics Plant
from Being Built on the Graves of Slaves, VICE (Dec. 19, 2019, 12:09 PM), https://
www.vice.com/en_us/article/bvg8bz/cancer-alley-residents-are-trying-to-stop-a-
huge-plastics-plant-from-being-built-on-the-graves-of-slaves (recounting residents’
reactions to discovery of burial grounds at proposed site).
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ishes in Louisiana are the equivalent of counties in other states.43
Formosa is a petrochemical company that plans to build an indus-
trial complex of petrochemical plants in Cancer Alley.44  The fight
against Formosa’s industrial complex is important for St. James Par-
ish residents because the complex is expected to produce large
amounts of plastic and toxic pollutants.45
Parish residents claim Formosa learned of the graves’ existence
in 2018.46  The residents are concerned there could be more
gravesites in the area than previously thought.47  Since discovering
the graves’ existence—which they claim Formosa hid from them—
the residents have been trying to use the gravesites as leverage to
prevent construction of another petrochemical facility in their com-
munity.48  Cancer Alley residents hope these gravesites will help
them preserve their heritage and protect their communities from
further pollution.49
Segregation’s legacy in Cancer Alley continues to oppress Afri-
can American communities by disproportionately exposing them to
pollution.50  Residential segregation and redlining became more
widespread when the South underwent an industrial transforma-
43. For a further discussion of parishes in Louisiana, see infra notes 64-78 and
accompanying text.
44. Lylla Younes ET AL., In a Notoriously Polluted Area of the Country, Massive New
Chemical Plants Are Still Moving In, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 30, 2019), https://
projects.propublica.org/louisiana-toxic-air/ (stating Formosa’s plans of building
mega-complex of petrochemical facilities).
45. See id. (detailing impact Formosa plant emissions will have on air quality);
see also Welcome to the Sunshine Project, SUNSHINE PROJECT, http://
www.sunshineprojectla.com/ (last visited June 13, 2020) (describing Formosa’s
planned industrial complex).  Formosa will invest $9.4 billion dollars into the pro-
ject and expects the complex to generate 1,200 permanent jobs in the St. James
Parish area once permits are approved. Id. (explaining goals of Sunshine Project).
Most of the products that will be produced are made out of plastic. Id. (listing car
casings, playground equipment, artificial turf, and polyester clothing as possible
products); see also Proposed Project, SUNSHINE PROJECT, http://www.sunshineproject
la.com/proposed-project (last visited June 13, 2020) (laying out phases of project
and proposed products).
46. See Lubben, supra note 42 (recounting residents’ accusations that For-
mosa did not share knowledge of possible gravesites with residents for seventeen
months).
47. Id. (insinuating Formosa has found more gravesites).  Parish residents be-
lieve the plantations previously located at the proposed site were part of a nearly
successful slave revolt in 1811. Id. (noting historical significance of land).
48. Id. (stating land represents residents’ painful history and they do not want
to disturb gravesites).
49. See id. (noting residents’ attempt to use burial grounds as leverage against
Formosa to prevent facility from opening).
50. See Mizutani, supra note 9, at 374 (implying segregation is why African
American communities in Cancer Alley are disproportionately exposed to
pollution).
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tion and its population grew in the early 1900s.51  Redlining is
“[c]redit discrimination . . . by an institution that refuses to provide
loans or insurance on properties in areas that are considered to be
poor financial risks or to the people who live in those areas.”52
In Louisiana, Jim Crow era policies exemplify redlining.53  Be-
cause of the need to construct new drainage systems during the
mid-1800s, white people in New Orleans forced African Americans
to move to the city’s poorly-drained areas.54  Racially restrictive cov-
enants and building permit denials in white neighborhoods en-
sured African Americans continued to live in these poorly-
constructed areas.55  This led to a geographic makeup where white
people lived in homes built on elevated ground, while relegating
African Americans to living in swamp land.56  For this reason, Afri-
can Americans were more likely to contract typhoid and malaria,
which increased their death rate.57
Displacement of African Americans to the poorly-drained areas
of New Orleans continued well into the twentieth century.58  Segre-
gation and Jim Crow laws “became the backdrop” to the devastation
51. Id. (describing how residential segregation became prevalent during Jim
Crow era).
52. Redlining, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining redlining).
See Terry Gross, A ‘Forgotten History’ of How the U.S. Government Segregated America,
NPR: RACE (May 3, 2017, 12:47 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/03/
526655831/a-forgotten-history-of-how-the-u-s-government-segregated-america (re-
counting how federal housing policies forced African Americans into urban hous-
ing projects); see also Steven Plitt & Daniel Maldonado, Prohibiting de Facto Insurance
Redlining: Will Hurricane Katrina Draw a Discriminatory Redline In the Gulf Coast Sands
Prohibiting Access to Home Ownership?, 14 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 199,
200 (2008) (describing redlining as prohibiting “certain individuals from acquir-
ing property”).
53. See Mizutani, supra note 9, at 375 (recounting how redlining prevented
African Americans in New Orleans from buying or renting homes in white
neighborhoods).
54. Id. (noting early instances of environmental burden-shifting).  Flooding is
an issue in New Orleans because the city is primarily below sea level. Id. (clarifying
how white people in New Orleans used drainage and sewage systems to oppress
city’s African American population).
55. Id. (explaining how city ordinances kept African Americans away from
white neighborhoods); see also Manuel Pastor ET AL., Environment, Disaster, and Race
After Katrina, 13 RACE, POVERTY & ENV’T 21, 23 (2006) (noting minorities’ difficulty
in recovering after natural disaster due to inequities related to redlining).
56. Mizutani, supra note 9, at 375 (describing New Orleans’s geographic lay-
out); see also Plitt & Maldonado, supra note 52, at 201 (noting minorities in after-
math of Hurricane Katrina had higher property damage because they lived in
poorly constructed homes).
57. Mizutani, supra note 9, at 375 (stating consequences of early segregation).
58. See generally id. (noting segregation’s long-lasting effects).
7
Castellón: Cancer Alley and the Fight Against Environmental Racism
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021
22 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL Vol. 32
Hurricane Katrina caused in 2005.59  Although Jim Crow laws were
officially overruled in the mid-twentieth century, their segregation
pattern remains and continues to affect Louisiana’s African Ameri-
can population.60  Even before Hurricane Katrina raged through
New Orleans, the city had the second-highest poverty level in the
country.61  After Hurricane Katrina, only fifty-three percent of Afri-
can American households could stay or return to their homes, as
opposed to the eighty-one percent of white households who were
able to return.62  Hurricane Katrina, therefore, highlighted the dev-
astating effects of segregation’s legacy by displacing most of New
Orleans’s poor, African American population.63
B. Louisiana’s Parishes and Industrial Zoning Decisions
Louisiana’s practice of redlining prevented poor African Amer-
icans from moving into primarily white neighborhoods, which led
many of them to move to rural, unincorporated towns in Cancer
Alley.64  Moreover, the African American population in New Orle-
ans grew after the Civil War, which meant more African Americans
had to live in unincorporated towns located in Cancer Alley at the
edge of plantations.65  A problem with unincorporated towns is that
local municipal corporations do not govern them.66  Many of the
towns in Cancer Alley are unincorporated, which means the towns
lack governance power over their own affairs and are instead gov-
erned by the councils of the parishes in which the towns are lo-
59. Id. at 376 (explaining segregation caused African American communities
to endure disproportionate amount of hardships after Hurricane Katrina); see also
Jim Crow Laws, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/early-20th-century-us/jim-
crow-laws (last updated June 6, 2020) (recounting history of Jim Crow laws).  Jim
Crow laws were statutes that legalized racial segregation. Id. (defining Jim Crow
laws).
60. See generally Mizutani, supra note 9, at 376 (implying unofficial segregation
remained in New Orleans).
61. Id. (pointing to high levels of poverty in New Orleans).
62. Id. at 378 (discussing empirical evidence showing Hurricane Katrina’s dis-
proportionate effect on African Americans in New Orleans).
63. See id. (illustrating Hurricane Katrina’s effects).
64. See id. at 372-73 (explaining why many African Americans moved to area
now known as Cancer Alley).  Hurricane Katrina increased housing prices in New
Orleans, which has left poor African Americans vulnerable to more redlining. Id.
at 379 (predicting possibility of future redlining because some areas in New Orle-
ans are still vulnerable to flooding).
65. See Mizutani, supra note 9, at 373-75 (explaining redlining forced African
Americans to live in segregated communities with unfavorable conditions).
66. Louise Gaille, 16 Biggest Pros and Cons of an Unincorporated Town, VITTANA
(June 25, 2019), https://vittana.org/16-biggest-pros-and-cons-of-an-unincorpo-
rated-town (listing benefits and drawbacks of living in unincorporated towns).
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cated.67  The lack of local governance in unincorporated towns
increases the likelihood that the area can be re-zoned at any
moment.68
A parish in Louisiana is the equivalent of a county in another
state.69  The parishes where the unincorporated towns are located
have the jurisdictional authority to establish governance rules in-
stead of the unincorporated towns themselves.70  When a pe-
trochemical company comes into the parish seeking to open a new
plant, residents of these unincorporated towns often suffer because
parish officials readily allow petrochemical companies to construct
their facilities near poor African American communities.71  The
predominantly white council of St. John the Baptist Parish, for ex-
ample, rezoned for industrial use the unincorporated town of Wal-
lace—a mostly African American town—so that Formosa could
construct a new plant.72
Parish residents have accused parish officials of putting indus-
trial interests before community interests.73  In 1998, council mem-
bers from Convent Parish were accused of providing Shintech, a
petrochemical company, with personality profiles of other council
members when it was trying to get its plant approved.74  Convent
citizens were concerned by the lack of procedures followed by the
LDEQ when it filed Shintech’s air pollution permit.75  The citizens
67. Mizutani, supra note 9, at 373 (characterizing lack of autonomy among
unincorporated towns in Cancer Alley).
68. Gaille, supra note 66 (noting common zoning issues in unincorporated
towns).
69. Gregory Sousa, Why Does Louisiana Have Parishes Instead of Counties?,
WORLD ATLAS (Apr. 25, 2017),  https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/why-does-lou-
isiana-have-parishes-and-not-counties.html (explaining origins of Louisiana’s par-
ish system).
70. See Mizutani, supra note 9, at 373 (explaining who is in charge of policies
and legislation in unincorporated towns).  There is not much research on how
many residents of unincorporated towns are represented in parish councils, but
because of the large number of petrochemical facilities located in unincorporated
towns, one can infer the residents do not receive much representation. See gener-
ally id. at 373-74 (elaborating on how petrochemical companies have freely pol-
luted Cancer Alley).
71. See id. at 373-74 (noting lack of representation for Cancer Alley’s African
American inhabitants).
72. Id. (providing example of rezoning residential areas to industrial).
73. Keehan, supra note 1, at 360 (showing parish officials’ disregard for com-
munities’ health interests).
74. Id. (providing example of businesses and parishes working together).  Par-
ish officials shredded the documents when Cancer Alley residents asked officials to
make them public. Id. (noting parish officials’ questionable actions).
75. Id. at 359 (demonstrating how LDEQ prioritized industrial interests over
citizens’ health).
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organized themselves to challenge the siting of the proposed plant
and attended public hearings to voice their opposition.76  Convent
citizens took prominent action to voice their concerns, including
collecting water samples from the river to present to LDEQ officials
and travelling to Tokyo to discuss with company officials the dan-
gers associated with the plant.77  Eventually, Shintech withdrew its
proposal for construction of a polyvinyl chloride (PVC) plant in
Convent after two years of strong community activism.78
III. LACK OF ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
The EPA designs environmental statutes to protect American
citizens from exposure to high levels of chemical pollution.79  One
of the most important statutes is the Clean Air Act (CAA), which is
designed to regulate air pollution at the national level.80  Other rel-
evant statutes include the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).81  Although Congress de-
signed these federal laws to protect citizens from pollution, the
EPA’s and state environmental agencies’ unequal enforcement of
these laws have actually perpetuated environmental racism in Can-
cer Alley and similar communities.82
President Clinton formally acknowledged the existence of, and
the need to prevent, environmental racism in 1994 when he signed
Executive Order 12898.83  Despite the Executive Order, it remains
difficult for a plaintiff to succeed on an environmental racism
76. Alejandro Colsa Pérez, Shintech PVC Plant in Convent, LA, USA, ENVTL.
JUST. ATLAS, https://ejatlas.org/conflict/shintech-pvc-plant-in-the-cancer-alley-usa
(last updated Aug. 7, 2015) (discussing Convent citizens’ mobilization and com-
munity activism).
77. Id. (discussing Convent citizens’ high-profile actions).  An eighty-year-old
Convent Parish citizen traveled to Tokyo, Japan to meet with the President and
CEO of Shin Etsu—Shintech’s parent company—to discuss the citizens’ opposi-
tion to the plant. Id. (noting citizens went to great lengths to oppose plant
construction).
78. Keehan, supra note 1, at 360 (describing activism’s impact on Shintech’s
relocation of proposed PVC plant).
79. Id. at 345, 350 (stating federal government has regulations designed to
protect public health).
80. Id. at 350 (specifying CAA’s importance).
81. See Ramirez Fisher, supra note 14, at 454 (describing Congressional intent
behind RCRA and CERCLA).
82. See Keehan, supra note 1, at 345 (providing overview of how CAA has
failed to protect communities like Cancer Alley).
83. See Oliver A. Houck, Shintech: Environmental Justice at Ground Zero, 31 GEO.
ENVTL. L. REV. 455, 475 (2019) (discussing President Clinton’s attempt to address
environmental racism).
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claim.84  Even after the EPA allowed environmental racism lawsuits
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, it has become nearly impossi-
ble for plaintiffs to prove environmental racism.85  Consequently,
the burdens imposed on plaintiffs bringing environmental racism
claims only serve to perpetuate environmental injustice.86
Section III will begin by exploring the CAA’s safeguards to reg-
ulate air pollutants.87  Next, this section will discuss how enforce-
ment of the CAA at both the federal and state levels fails to protect
Cancer Alley residents.88  This section will then analyze the effects
of federal laws like CERCLA and RCRA on overburdened commu-
nities of color.89  Finally, Section III will conclude by contemplating
the forms of relief available for environmental racism plaintiffs and
by pondering the proposed Environmental Justice Act.90
A. Air Pollutants
The CAA lists six common air pollutants, also known as “crite-
ria air pollutants,” that can cause damage to health, property, and
the environment.91  The criteria air pollutants the CAA regulates
are (1) ground-level ozone, (2) particulate matter, (3) carbon mon-
oxide, (4) lead, (5) sulfur dioxide, and (6) nitrogen dioxide.92  As
required by the CAA, the EPA is responsible for establishing Na-
tional Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for each enumer-
ated pollutant.93  NAAQS place a limit on the atmospheric
concentration of these pollutants.94
84. See id. (discussing difficulty of winning environmental racism suits); see also
Mizutani, supra note 9, at 381-82 (explaining different barriers in environmental
racism suits).
85. See Houck, supra note 83, at 474-75 (noting courts added extra require-
ment of proving discriminatory intent).  For a further discussion of environmental
racism lawsuits under Title VI, see infra notes 149-78 and accompanying text.
86. Id. at 500 (warning Trump Administration considered abolishing EPA’s
Office of Civil Rights).
87. For a further discussion of the CAA’s regulation of air pollutants, see infra
notes 91–103 and accompanying text.
88. For a further discussion of enforcement of the CAA, see infra notes
104–135 and accompanying text.
89. For a detailed discussion of CERCLA’s and RCRA’s effects on communi-
ties of color, see infra notes 136–148 and accompanying text.
90. For a discussion on environmental lawsuits under Title VI and the pro-
posed Environmental Justice Act, see infra notes 149-188 and accompanying text.
91. Criteria Air Pollutants, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants
(last updated Mar. 8, 2018) (describing criteria air pollutants).
92. Id. (listing common air pollutants).
93. Id. (noting EPA’s responsibility for overseeing pollutants).
94. Keehan, supra note 1, at 351 (indicating NAAQS’s purpose).
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The CAA also employs the National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) to regulate emissions of toxic
substances not covered by the NAAQS.95  The NESHAPs address
pollutants that are known or believed to cause “cancer or other seri-
ous health effects . . . .”96  As part of the NESHAPs, the CAA dis-
cusses “emissions of hazardous air pollutants from both major
sources and area sources.”97  Major sources annually emit at least
ten tons of one type of hazardous air pollutant or at least twenty-five
tons of a combination of pollutants.98  Area sources are defined as
all other sources that do not fall under the major source
definition.99
The EPA utilizes a two-step process “to regulate hazardous air
pollutants produced by both major and area source industrial facili-
ties . . . .”100  First, the EPA must establish technology-based stan-
dards, based on the most compliant source’s emission level, that
regulate emissions from a certain “industrial group” or “source cat-
egory.”101  Then, eight years after those standards are set, the EPA
“must assess remaining health risks” from each source or group.102
The EPA uses this assessment to establish whether the technology-
based standard “adequately protects public health . . . and protects
against adverse environmental effects.”103
B. Federal Enforcement of CAA
The CAA tasks the EPA with ensuring petrochemical facilities
are complying with it.104  When the EPA’s Inspector General con-
ducted an assessment of the CAA’s enforcement in 2011, it found
Louisiana ranked “in the bottom quarter of all states in enforcing
the Clean Air Act . . . .”105  Pollution regulations have failed to pro-
tect Cancer Alley’s population because industrial interests often
95. Id. at 350, 353 (listing additional CAA regulatory programs for air
pollutants).
96. Id. at 353 (stating effects of hazardous air pollutants).
97. Id. (addressing sources of pollution outlined in Section 112 of CAA).
98. Id. (describing major sources according to CAA).
99. Keehan, supra note 1, at 353 (defining area sources).
100. Id. (listing steps EPA must take to regulate pollutants).
101. Id. at 353-54 (explaining first step in regulating hazardous air pollu-
tants).  The standard to control emissions is based on the level that “the best-con-
trolled and lowest emitting source(s) in the industry” achieve(s). Id. (explaining
how standard is calculated).
102. Id. at 354 (discussing second step involving assessing health risks).
103. Id. (describing health-based assessment).
104. See Keehan, supra note 1, at 354 (detailing EPA’s responsibilities).
105. Gordon Russell, In “Cancer Alley,” Toxic Polluters Face Little Oversight from
Environmental Regulators, PROPUBLICA: POLLUTERS PARADISE (Dec. 19, 2019, 1:30
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outweigh the community’s interests in enforcement of the CAA in
the area.106  The CAA notably prohibits the EPA from considering
costs when setting NAAQS.107  Nevertheless, the influence of indus-
trial interests is evident because the EPA still considers costs when
developing and reviewing NAAQS.108
The CAA does not require the EPA to impose standards that
eliminate every health risk when setting NAAQS.109  The CAA, in-
stead, allows the EPA to consider what standards are practicable for
industrial companies to comply with, so that they are not financially
burdened.110  Although the EPA has interpreted the CAA to ex-
clude cost as a factor in determining what qualifies as clean air, cost
can be considered when contemplating how to implement a clean
air standard.111  This system inevitably leads the EPA to consider
the cost of compliance for industrial companies, thereby rendering
industrial interests one of the determining factors in setting
standards.112
When the EPA collects data to determine whether an area has
met attainment (i.e., met the NAAQS), it calculates attainment
based on an average or percentile.113  Because the EPA bases attain-
ment on averages and percentiles instead of the entire data from a
location, the results it uses to calculate attainment could be
skewed.114  This means an area could meet attainment despite occa-
PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/in-cancer-alley-toxic-polluters-face-little-
oversight-from-environmental-regulators (discussing Louisiana’s shortcomings).
106. Keehan, supra note 1, at 355 (describing factors affecting CAA’s
enforcement).
107. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 467-68 (2001) (hold-
ing EPA may not consider costs in implementing national air quality standards); see
also Keehan, supra note 1, at 355 (noting CAA’s prohibition against considering
costs).
108. Keehan, supra note 1, at 355 (noting how EPA does not adhere to CAA’s
NAAQS guidelines).
109. Id. at 355-56 (explaining purposes of NAAQS).
110. Id. at 356 (noting CAA’s flexibility for setting standards).
111. Id. (explaining EPA’s interpretation on cost consideration).
112. Id. (noting conflict to which cost consideration leads).  The CAA prohib-
its the EPA from basing standards “in whole or in part,” on financial costs. Id.
(providing examples of when EPA has considered costs in setting NAAQS).
113. Keehan, supra note 1, at 357 (illustrating how NAAQS work); see also Air
Quality Designations for Ozone, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ozone-designations (last
updated Apr. 14, 2020) (defining attainment and non-attainment).
114. Keehan, supra note 1, at 357 (describing problem with EPA’s system).
See Bob Weinhold, Ozone Nation: EPA Standard Panned by the People, 116 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSP. A302, A304 (2008) (discussing how ozone standard EPA set re-
ceives incomplete information).  The EPA rests its approach for reviewing ozone
standards on “the three-year average of the fourth highest reading . . . [,]” which
means this approach “ignores the three-highest readings and discounts high indi-
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sionally exceeding safe air quality standards.115  This flaw makes it
harder for the EPA to deem areas in Cancer Alley as non-attain-
ment areas, thereby letting violations of the CAA go unchecked.116
C. State Enforcement of CAA
The State of Louisiana tasks the Louisiana Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality (LDEQ) with regulating toxic air emissions.117
When a petrochemical company is looking to build a new facility in
Louisiana, it must obtain a permit from the LDEQ.118  Additionally,
the company must request permission from the LDEQ if it wants to
increase toxic emissions in the area it is polluting.119  While Louisi-
ana designed the LDEQ to protect the health of its citizens, the
LDEQ often prioritizes industrial and business interests over public
welfare.120  The LDEQ often justifies its decisions favoring indus-
trial interests by arguing the social and economic benefits of the
petrochemical plants far outweigh the “adverse environmental im-
pacts.”121  The “benefits” to which the LDEQ refers are economic,
namely the creation of jobs and the money companies invest in de-
veloping the land.122  Cancer Alley residents rarely get to reap these
benefits, yet their air is being polluted by the companies that prom-
ised them jobs.123
vidual years.” Id. (demonstrating difficulties with EPA’s approach for calculating
compliance).
115. Keehan, supra note 1, at 357 (explaining how EPA determines attain-
ment); see also Weinhold, supra note 114, at A304 (stating it matters which three-
year period EPA chooses as readings can vary from year to year).
116. See Keehan, supra note 1, at 358 (arguing current environmental regula-
tions are not strong enough to protect public health in Cancer Alley).
117. See generally Russell, supra note 105 (explaining LDEQ’s responsibilities).
118. See id. (stating what polluting companies do to obtain permits).
119. See id. (recounting how Noranda Alumina plant requested permission to
keep emitting half ton of mercury).
120. See id. (implying LDEQ readily granted Noranda’s permit to continue
emitting tons of mercury).
121. Id. (showing LDEQ’s justifications for putting citizens’ health at risk).
Because Louisiana’s economy relies on oil and gas exploration, petrochemical
plants are crucial in keeping the state’s economy afloat. See id. (implying why envi-
ronmental regulation has not been a priority in Louisiana).
122. Russell, supra note 105 (quoting LDEQ as stating plant was “critical to
ensure . . . domestic supply” of aluminum).  The plant in question was a Noranda
Alumina plant that was emitting half a ton of mercury into the air. Id. (clarifying
Noranda Alumina plant’s controversy).
123. See Houck, supra note 83, at 461-63 (stating plants tend to hire African
American residents last).  Plant construction often requires skilled workers from
outside the area, and permanent positions in the plants require workers with de-
grees in computer science and engineering. Id. at 462 (noting difficulty of ob-
taining jobs at petrochemical plants).  Residents in Convent, St. James, and St.
Gabriel Parishes have had difficulty obtaining the jobs promised to their communi-
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Petrochemical companies tend to build their facilities in Loui-
siana, particularly in Cancer Alley, because they often receive tax
breaks and subsidies from the state.124  While the LDEQ argues it is
fulfilling its regulatory duties, environmental activists disagree, not-
ing the state allows petrochemical plants to expedite the permit ap-
proval process by paying LDEQ employees overtime.125  Companies
that want to expedite the permitting process must pay for the
LDEQ employees’ overtime because of the agency’s staffing is-
sues.126  With the petrochemical industry paying the agency de-
signed to regulate it, environmental activists have criticized the
expedited permit process for creating an obvious conflict of
interest.127
Additionally, the LDEQ once found itself at the center of a
lawsuit between the citizens of St. James Parish and Shintech.128
Parish residents argued that instead of acting like an independent
agency, LDEQ acted as Shintech’s agent, lobbyist, and as an oppo-
nent to St. James Citizens for Jobs and the Environment (St. James
Citizens).129  St. James Citizens filed a motion to recuse the LDEQ
in the permit approval process for Shintech’s PVC plant; however,
the Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit, denied the motion,
holding there was no “statutory entitlement to judicial review” at
that stage because the permit was not yet approved.130  The court
ties, with St. James applicants being told they will not “cut it” and St. Gabriel re-
sidents holding less than nine percent of jobs in the industry. Id. (implying racism
is behind lack of industry jobs in Cancer Alley).
124. Russell, supra note 105 (describing why petrochemical companies choose
to open plants in Louisiana).
125. Id. (stating permit applicants must pay LDEQ’s permit reviewer’s
overtime).
126. Id. (noting how Louisiana governors have history of cutting funds to
LDEQ). See also Expedited Permit Program, LA. DEP’T ENVTL. QUALITY, https://
www.deq.louisiana.gov/page/expedited-permit-program (last visited June 14,
2020) (providing forms for petrochemical companies to apply for expedited per-
mit processing).  Acts 586 and 779 of the 2006 Regular Legislative Session allow
petrochemical companies to reimburse the LDEQ for the overtime paid to LDEQ
employees who worked to expedite approval for a permit. Id. (proclaiming stat-
utes allow LDEQ to hire contractors, if necessary, to expedite approval process).
127. Russell, supra note 105 (equating overtime payment for expedited per-
mit processing with student bribing teacher who is grading paper).
128. See Houck, supra note 83, at 468 (recounting how LDEQ is supposed to
be independent regulatory agency); see also In re Shintech, 734 So. 2d 772, 773-74
(La. Ct. App. 1999) (summarizing group’s motion to recuse LDEQ’s secretary).
129. Houck, supra note 83, at 464, 468 (arguing LDEQ protected industrial
interests, not citizens’ health).  St. James Citizens is an integrated, environmental
activist group from St. James Parish in Cancer Alley. Id. at 464 (describing plaintiff
St. James Citizens).
130. In re Shintech, 734 So. 2d at 774 (vacating district court’s decision order-
ing LDEQ to hold hearing on impartiality issue).
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held the right to judicial review exists when there is a constitutional
deprivation, but because there was no such deprivation here, the
court could not intervene.131
Like the LDEQ, Louisiana state officials have also advocated
for industrial interests.132  When Shintech proposed building its
$700 million petrochemical plant in Cancer Alley, Louisiana Gover-
nor Mike Foster offered Shintech a ten-year, $130 million industrial
tax exemption provided they locate the plant in Convent.133  Over
the past three decades, Louisiana governors have also reduced
funding for the LDEQ, which has perpetuated staffing issues.134
The LDEQ, however, denies being understaffed, arguing “numbers
don’t tell the whole story.”135
D. Other Federal Laws that Burden Cancer Alley Residents
Congress enacted CERCLA and RCRA to confront the dangers
of hazardous waste disposal.136  The waste management system cre-
ated by CERCLA and RCRA does not account for the inequitable
dispersion of environmental hardships across the country, even de-
spite Congress’s best intentions.137  Specifically, CERCLA and
RCRA do not consider the number of hazardous waste facilities that
are placed in economically disadvantaged communities of color.138
By enacting RCRA, Congress expected states to manage their
own hazardous waste programs.139  To administer these programs,
the states make siting decisions via permitting systems under
131. Id. (vacating district court’s judgment and dismissing suit).
132. See Keehan, supra note 1, at 359 (discussing concern over tax breaks
given to Shintech).
133. Id. (discussing Governor Foster’s tax exemptions).  The tax exemption
affected the local community, which would have benefitted from the tax revenue
Shintech generated. Id. (lamenting loss of tax revenue from Shintech).  Convent
is a predominantly African American community in Cancer Alley. See Houck, supra
note 83, at 458 (describing how Shintech’s proposed plant in Convent would emit
three million tons of air pollution per year).
134. Russell, supra note 105 (discussing cuts made by Governor Bobby Jindal
to LDEQ).
135. Id. (highlighting LDEQ argument that it has never missed its regulatory
commitments).
136. Ramirez Fisher, supra note 14, at 454 (expressing Congress’s intentions).
137. Id. at 454-55 (noting problems with enforcement of CERCLA and
RCRA).
138. See id. at 455 (stating CERCLA and RCRA disproportionately strain com-
munities of color).
139. Saha & Mohai, supra note 18, at 624 (noting Congress’s expectations in
enacting RCRA).
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RCRA.140  The problem with RCRA permitting programs is that the
public cannot participate in the siting process until the state envi-
ronmental agency has already made a decision.141  Public participa-
tion is one of the means that members of the community can use to
challenge siting decisions; obstructing public participation until the
state environmental agency conveys a decision makes challenging
siting decisions even more difficult.142  Additionally, challenging
permit approvals requires “considerable technical, legal, and finan-
cial resources” that are typically unavailable to disadvantaged peo-
ple of color and low-income communities.143  Because these
facilities are often located in poor communities of color, the re-
sidents of those communities end up bearing the health risks associ-
ated with pollution.144
Despite Congress’s intentions in enacting RCRA and CERCLA,
states unequally enforce the statutes to the detriment of people of
color.145  For example, the unequal enforcement of “federal envi-
ronmental laws governing air, water, and waste pollution” generates
higher penalties for petrochemical companies that commit viola-
tions in white neighborhoods compared to violations in communi-
ties of color.146  Additionally, hazardous waste sites that have been
abandoned in predominantly white communities are prioritized
under CERCLA’s cleanup program, as opposed to those in commu-
nities of color which, on average, “take twenty percent longer to be
placed on the national priority list . . . .”147  While RCRA and CER-
140. Id. (describing how siting decisions are made).  The purpose of these
programs is to ensure “protection of human health and the environment in the
construction, operation, and closure” of hazardous waste facilities. Id. (stating pur-
pose of RCRA’s permitting programs).
141. Id. (detailing RCRA permitting programs’ framework).
142. Id. at 624-25 (stating problems with RCRA’s configuration).
143. Id. at 625 (explaining hardships RCRA imposes on impoverished and
minority communities).
144. See Ramirez Fisher, supra note 14, at 460-61 (discussing health costs of
hazardous waste facilities).
145. Id. (describing unequal enforcement of laws).  Congress enacted CER-
CLA and RCRA to combat pollution from hazardous waste disposal facilities. Id. at
454-55 (concluding CERCLA and RCRA ultimately created waste management sys-
tem which failed to account for unequal distribution of environmental burdens).
146. Id. at 461 (listing different instances of unequal enforcement).
147. Id. (noting communities’ different treatment under CERCLA).  In an
analysis of a study that examined the unequal enforcement of hazardous waste site
cleanup, the authors found that, regardless of socioeconomic status, race predomi-
nantly impacted site cleanup. See Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protec-
tion: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, 15 NAT’L L. J. 1, 1 (1992) (concluding
people of color are disproportionately affected by pollution).
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CLA may be enforced unequally, they are facially neutral, thus mak-
ing it difficult for potential plaintiffs to challenge the laws.148
E. Suing for Environmental Racism
To sue for environmental racism, litigants may bring a lawsuit
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.149  The Equal Protection Clause applies to environmental
racism lawsuits because petrochemical facilities are disproportion-
ately located in communities of color.150  It is difficult to bring suit
under the Equal Protection Clause because, according to Supreme
Court precedent, plaintiffs must show government decisionmakers
acted with discriminatory intent.151  This level of scrutiny has en-
sured that Equal Protection Clause litigation remains
unsuccessful.152
Alternatively, plaintiffs may bring an environmental racism
claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.153  Title VI prohibits
discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in federally-
funded programs.154  Previously, the EPA stated it was not subject to
Title VI claims because it was “not in a position to assess the effects
its decisions have on people protected by the [Civil Rights A]ct.”155
Following President Clinton’s Executive Order in 1994, however,
the EPA began reviewing Title VI claims.156  The excitement be-
hind Title VI litigation quickly faded after the Supreme Court held
in Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission157 that Title VI
claims require proof of discriminatory intent.158
148. See Ramirez Fisher, supra note 14, at 458 (noting arguments made by
companies and agencies accused of environmental racism).
149. Id. at 468 (reviewing ways plaintiffs can sue).
150. Id. (describing Equal Protection Clause relevance in environmental ra-
cism suits).
151. Id. at 468-69 (noting Supreme Court precedent requires discriminatory
intent to sue under Fourteenth Amendment).
152. Id. at 469 (proposing courts change level of scrutiny for environmental
racism cases).
153. See Ramirez Fisher, supra note 14, at 471 (discussing other legal remedies
available).
154. See Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2018)
(barring discrimination based on race, color, and national origin).
155. Ramirez Fisher, supra note 14, at 472 (explaining EPA’s rationale).
156. See id. (noting progression of Title VI litigation).
157. See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983) (af-
firming lower court decision on other grounds).
158. Id. (holding proof of discriminatory intent is not required to establish
Title VI violation, but proof of discriminatory intent is required to receive compen-
satory relief).
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Although the Supreme Court ruled in Lau v. Nichols159 that dis-
criminatory effect was sufficient to bring a Title VI claim regardless
of the defendant’s intent, the Court’s decision in Alexander v. Sando-
val160 called Lau into question.161  In Sandoval, the Supreme Court
held that Title VI did not create a private right of action for discrim-
inatory impact claims but was meant to reach only instances of dis-
criminatory intent.162  Plaintiffs have subsequently moved away
from filing Title VI claims because of the Supreme Court’s holding
in Sandoval, which perpetuates Title VI’s high evidentiary bar.163
Environmental racism plaintiffs have recently moved toward fil-
ing Title VI claims under the EPA’s administrative complaint pro-
cess.164  Title VI administrative complaints, however, can only be
asserted against recipients of federal funds and must allege dispa-
rate impact.165  Complainants must include two elements in the
complaint: (1) “a description of the discriminatory acts alleged,”
and (2) “evidence that the discriminator receives federal funds
. . . .”166  The administrative complaint process, however, can still
present some challenges.167
The first major hurdle of the administrative complaint process
is the EPA’s unresponsiveness.168  Although the EPA’s Office of
Civil Rights is supposed to accept or dismiss these complaints within
twenty days of receipt, the Office rarely meets this deadline.169  Ad-
ditionally, for the complaints the Office does accept, the EPA has
implemented a “180-day regulatory deadline” to complete the inves-
tigation.170  A report from Deloitte found that “out of 247 com-
159. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (ruling discrimination is barred
when it has discriminatory effect regardless of intent).
160. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284-85 (2001) (holding there is
implied private right of action for intentional discrimination but not for disparate
impact).
161. See id. at 285 (rejecting Lau’s interpretation of Title VI as reaching be-
yond intentional discrimination).
162. Id. at 280-81, 293 (holding Title VI did not create private right of action
for disparate impact).  The Court held it was clear § 601 of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act prohibited only intentional discrimination. Id. at 281 (clarifying Title
VI’s purpose).
163. Mizutani, supra note 9, at 382 (stating consequences of Supreme Court’s
decision in Sandoval).
164. Id. (noting only recourse left to environmental justice plaintiffs).
165. Id. (explaining when Title VI administrative complaints are available).
166. Id. (listing necessary elements of complaint).
167. Id. (acknowledging it can also be difficult to prevail in administrative
complaints).
168. See Mizutani, supra note 9, at 382-83 (noting EPA’s delayed response).
169. Id. at 382 (stating Office of Civil Rights rarely adheres to deadline).
170. Id. (explaining EPA’s 180-day regulatory deadline).
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plaints received by 2011, only [six percent] of requests were
accepted or denied within the deadline.”171  Further, some of the
unanswered claims stretched back ten years, well beyond the 180-
day regulatory deadline.172
The second hurdle comes from the “effects test” the EPA uses
to determine disparate impact when reviewing Title VI administra-
tive complaints.173  This test is similar to the disparate impact test
employed in Title VII cases.174  Courts interpret the “effects test” as
a balancing test in which they consider the defendant’s “substantial
legitimate justification” for the action and an alternative course of
action that would have less of a disparate effect on the plaintiffs.175
This test adds to the increasing difficulty of winning a Title VI claim
because courts have been reluctant to find for plaintiffs when a pol-
icy is facially neutral and necessary to meet a legitimate goal.176
Consequently, even if plaintiffs are able to show disparate impact in
a case, the discriminatory action may still be permissible if it ad-
vances a legitimate goal and there is not a less discriminatory op-
tion.177  Because of the high evidentiary burden the Supreme Court
171. Id. (noting low percentage of claims processed); see also Albert Huang,
Environmental Justice and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act: A Critical Crossroads, A.B.A.:
ENV’T, ENERGY, & RESOURCES (Mar. 1, 2012), https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/environment_energy_resources/publications/trends/2011_12/
march_april/environmental_justice_title_vi_civil_rights_act/ (discussing Deloitte’s
evaluation of EPA’s Title VI administrative complaint process).
172. Mizutani, supra note 9, at 382 (implying EPA’s Office of Civil Rights is
ineffective in processing Title VI claims).
173. Id. at 383 (mentioning standard for Title VI cases).  The EPA has a six-
step investigatory process for assessing disparate impact:
1) assessing the applicability of Title VI regulations; 2) determining the
appropriate scope of the investigation; 3) evaluating the actual impacts;
4) determining whether the impact was adverse; 5) characterizing the
demographic of the affected population; and 6) deciding whether the
adverse disparate impact is sufficiently significant. Each of these six steps
requires data showing causality, the severity of the impact, and demo-
graphic information which may not be significant enough for the EPA to
believe there is an adverse disparate impact.
Id. (listing six steps in investigatory process).
174. Id. (comparing “effects test” to “disparate impact test”).
175. Id. at 384 (explaining balancing test).  Economic interests that could
harm segregated communities can constitute legitimate goals. Id. (noting diffi-
culty of overcoming balancing test).
176. Id. (describing difficulty of winning Title VI claims); see also New York
City Envtl. Justice All. v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding de-
fendants had substantial legitimate justification and plaintiffs had not shown less
discriminatory alternatives were available).
177. See Mizutani, supra note 9, at 384 (reiterating difficulty of obtaining
favorable judgment).  For plaintiffs to meet the disparate impact test, courts re-
quire them to show defendants are unable to provide a “substantial legitimate justi-
fication” for their actions or that there is a less discriminatory option available for
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and the EPA have imposed on environmental justice plaintiffs,
those affected by environmental racism are further disenfranchised
by so-called “racially neutral” laws.178
F. President Clinton’s Executive Order and the Proposed
Environmental Justice Act
When President Clinton signed Executive Order 12898, many
civil rights and environmental activists thought it would help peo-
ple of color to combat environmental racism.179  President Clinton
signed the Executive Order to address specifically how communi-
ties of color are disproportionately affected by environmental pollu-
tion.180  While there was some “initial flurry of activity” after the
Executive Order was signed, environmental justice concerns were
quickly set aside.181  Further, the importance of environmental jus-
tice waned after President Clinton left office and the Bush Adminis-
tration retreated from the Executive Order’s principles and
enforcement.182
Some politicians have proposed an Environmental Justice Act
(EJA) to help individuals who are most at risk of being exposed to
pollution.183  The first politician to propose an EJA was then Sena-
the defendants’ legitimate goals. See Giuliani, 214 F.3d at 72 (finding plaintiffs
failed to meet either prong).
178. See Ramirez Fisher, supra note 14, at 458 (noting how companies and
agencies defend themselves against racism claims).
179. See Mizutani, supra note 9, at 380 (describing environmental activists’ ini-
tial excitement about Executive Order).
180. See id. at 379-80 (explaining Executive Order’s purposes).
181. Id. at 380 (noting how environmental justice lost its place on federal
government’s agenda).
182. Id. (stating how Bush EPA challenged and changed environmental jus-
tice’s meaning).  The Assistant Inspector General stated in a 2004 report on envi-
ronmental justice that the EPA had not fully implemented nor fully complied with
the intent of President Clinton’s Executive Order on environmental justice. See
OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REP. NO. 2004-P-00007, EPA
NEEDS TO CONSISTENTLY IMPLEMENT THE INTENT OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ON ENVI-
RONMENTAL JUSTICE 7 (2004) (noting EPA had not identified or addressed dispro-
portionately adverse health or environmental effects of its policies on minority and
low-income populations).  Additionally, the Assistant Inspector General found that
the EPA changed the environmental justice program’s focus by “de-emphasizing
minority and low-income populations,” and focusing instead on environmental jus-
tice for everyone. Id. at 10-11 (noting EPA’s interpretation of environmental jus-
tice moved EPA’s focus away from populations Order was designed to protect). See
also Talia Buford, Has the Moment for Environmental Justice Been Lost?, PROPUBLICA
(July 24, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/has-the-moment-for-
environmental-justice-been-lost (stating EPA was not performing Executive Or-
der’s required environmental justice reviews).
183. Claire L. Hasler, Comment, The Proposed Environmental Justice Act: “I Have
a (Green) Dream”, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 417, 417 (1994) (expressing purpose
of Environmental Justice Act).
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tor Al Gore.184  Although former Vice President Gore’s proposed
EJA was never passed, other senators have tried to revive the Act
since it was first introduced in Congress in 1992.185  Most recently,
Senator Cory Booker reintroduced another iteration of the EJA.186
Senator Booker has visited communities across the United States
that struggle with environmental racism, including Cancer Alley, as
part of his environmental justice initiative.187  Despite Senator
Booker’s efforts, it is unlikely that the bill will pass given the history
of environmental justice legislation that has died in committee.188
IV. THE DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING REPRESENTATION AND THE
TULANE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CLINIC CONTROVERSY
Because most of Cancer Alley’s inhabitants are poor, they often
cannot afford to pay for legal representation to challenge the siting
of toxic waste facilities.189  One of the few ways Cancer Alley re-
sidents can secure representation is through environmental organi-
zations or legal aid programs, such as the Tulane Environmental
Law Clinic (TELC).190  In the fall of 1998, however, Louisiana Gov-
ernor Mike Foster and petrochemical businesses began to attack
the TELC for representing some of Louisiana’s most disen-
184. Id. (acknowledging Senator who proposed EJA).
185. Id. at 418 (noting increased interest in environmental racism).
186. Booker Reintroduces Sweeping Environmental Justice Bill, CORY BOOKER: U.S.
SENATOR FOR N.J. (July 24, 2019), https://www.booker.senate.gov/?p=press_re
lease&id=966 (reporting Senator Booker’s introduction of environmental justice
legislation).  Section 5(a)(1) of the Environmental Justice Act of 2019 states that
every federal agency must make achieving environmental justice part of its mission.
See Environmental Justice Act of 2019, S. 2236, 116th Cong. § 5(a)(1) (2019) (re-
quiring federal agencies to consider adverse health and environmental effects on
communities of color and low-income communities).  Additionally, the Act ex-
pressly grants a private right of action to any person affected by a federal agency’s
failure to comply with the Act or with a regulation promulgated under the Act. See
id. § 10(a) (amending § 602 of Civil Rights Act of 1964 to provide private right of
action for disparate impact).
187. Booker Reintroduces Sweeping Environmental Justice Bill, supra note 186 (list-
ing communities Senator Booker has visited).  Senator Booker also co-founded the
Senate’s “first-ever” Environmental Justice Caucus to highlight environmental jus-
tice issues affecting the nation. Id. (detailing Senator Booker’s environmental jus-
tice activism).
188. See Hasler, supra note 183, at 472 (explaining problems with drafting of
environmental justice legislation).
189. See Houck, supra note 83, at 466-67 (recounting how difficult it was for
St. James Parish’s residents to obtain representation).
190. See id. at 456-57 (describing how Tulane law students often took cases
challenging siting of petrochemical plants).
22
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol32/iss1/2
CANCER ALLEY 37
franchised citizens.191  Governor Foster even petitioned the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court to forbid Tulane’s law students from practicing
environmental law.192  As TELC students were defending poor peo-
ple of color in their fight against toxic pollution, Governor Foster’s
actions demonstrate how difficult it is for Cancer Alley residents to
challenge siting decisions.193
The controversy started when Shintech was trying to build a
PVC plant in Convent, Louisiana.194  Like most areas in Cancer Al-
ley, Convent was a mostly poor, African American community.195
Shintech’s proposed plant was projected to emit approximately
three million tons of pollutants per year.196  Among the possibly
emitted pollutants were dioxin, ethylene chloride, and vinyl chlo-
ride, which are all carcinogens.197  As news of the proposed plant
spread, an integrated group of concerned citizens known as St.
James Citizens for Jobs and the Environment (St. James Citizens)
prepared to fight the plant’s construction.198
Initially, the TELC avoided taking the group’s case.199  But af-
ter St. James Citizens was unable to find an organization to re-
present them, the TELC’s director decided to take the case.200
Governor Foster’s Deputy Chief of Staff, concerned TELC would
take the case, phoned the clinic director, which may have tipped
the scale in favor of the TELC taking the group’s case.201
The TELC students represented St. James Citizens in public
hearings and challenged the “air, water, and coastal zone permits”
granted to Shintech.202 Additionally, the TELC “petitioned [the]
EPA to review and override” the air permits the state granted
191. See id. at 456 (narrating how Louisiana’s businesses gathered with Gover-
nor Foster to stop Tulane law students from interfering with Louisiana’s
businesses).
192. Id. at 457 (noting lengths Governor Foster went to).
193. See generally id. at 458 (implying Governor Foster tried to make it impossi-
ble for citizens to find legal representation).
194. See Houck, supra note 83, at 457-58 (recounting events leading to Tulane
Clinic controversy).
195. Id. at 458 (describing community where plant would be located).
196. Id. (expressing concern for pollution Shintech’s plant would generate).
197. Id. (listing pollutants that plant would emit).
198. Id. at 464 (recounting how St. James Parish citizens gathered to plan how
to fight Shintech).
199. See Houck, supra note 83, at 466 (noting clinic supervisor initially tried to
avoid case because of how long and complicated it was).
200. Id. at 466-67 (recounting how St. James Citizens struggled to find
representation).
201. See id. at 467 (noting how controversial case was).
202. Id. (recounting students’ actions).
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Shintech and filed a Title VI claim.203  In 1997, the TELC filed the
first petition requesting the EPA Regional Office in Dallas, Texas to
deny Shintech’s permits for reasons including disparate impact and
CAA violations.204  In response to the petition, the Regional Office
denied Shintech’s permits after finding they contained technical er-
rors, but it rejected the Title VI claim as being beyond the office’s
scope.205
After listening to citizen complaints about the disproportion-
ate number of cancer deaths in the area and the lack of jobs, the
TELC filed a new Title VI claim, this time with the EPA’s Office of
Civil Rights.206  The EPA granted the petition to investigate envi-
ronmental justice violations, which seemed to be the final affront in
the Shintech controversy.207  Shintech decided not to build its PVC
plant in St. James and instead chose another town along the Missis-
sippi River.208
After Shintech abandoned construction of the plant, Governor
Foster and the Business Council of New Orleans sent a petition to
the Louisiana Supreme Court complaining that the TELC was “bad
for business” and its views were “in direct conflict with business posi-
tions.”209  Conversely, some Louisiana newspapers accused the Lou-
isiana Association of Business and Industry (LABI) of trying to
quash “even the most rag-tag opposition” to Louisiana’s policy al-
lowing petrochemical companies to pollute entire communities.210
In June 1998, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued new restrictions
for law student practice.211  Although the restrictions were directed
at all law student clinics in Louisiana, Tulane Law School staff be-
lieve the TELC was the target of the restrictions.212
203. See id. (describing state’s permit as “hastily-granted”).  The state granted
the air permit the day after Shintech submitted a massive administrative record.
See id. (expressing problem with how state reviewed air permit).
204. Houck, supra note 83, at 481 (recounting steps St. James Citizens took to
get permits denied).
205. Id. (explaining outcome of petition).
206. Id. (describing environmental justice issues that inspired second
petition).
207. See id. at 482, 506 (recounting events leading to Governor Foster’s
petition).
208. See id. at 506 (summarizing outcome of Shintech controversy).
209. Houck, supra note 83, at 491-93 (restating what petition said).
210. Id. at 496 (implying Louisiana industrial business tried to crush all
opposition).
211. Id. at 496-97 (recounting restrictions court imposed on student
attorneys).
212. Id. at 495 (noting real target of petition was TELC); see also Robert R.
Keuhn, Denying Access to Legal Representation: The Attack on the Tulane Environmental
Law Clinic, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 33, 77-78 (2000) (recounting how TELC was
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The court’s restrictions were essentially a compromise between
Governor Foster, LABI, and the TELC.213  The court rejected some
of the proposed restrictions, such as those requiring students to re-
present businesses and government agencies in addition to low-in-
come clients.214  Another requirement the court rejected proposed
that there be outside review of clinic cases by a body of people rep-
resenting all the interests affected.215  The court, however, prohib-
ited representation of any organization with a national counterpart,
such as the Sierra Club.216  One restriction the court adopted set
stringent indigency thresholds for both individuals and groups rep-
resented by clinics, which allowed the students to represent only
those below the federal poverty line.217
Later in 1998, however, Louisiana Supreme Court Chief Justice
Calogero eased some of the new restrictions.218  The poverty thresh-
old required for representation was increased to 200 percent of the
federal poverty line.219  The court also abandoned its prohibition
on representing organizations affiliated with national groups alto-
gether.220  The court further clarified that the rules only applied to
law students, so any plaintiffs who did not qualify for representation
by clinic students could be represented by a clinic’s attorney.221
specifically targeted for investigation due to business groups’ complaint letter). See
Adam Babich, How the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic Survived the Shintech Contro-
versy and Rule XX Revisions: Some Questions and Answers, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11476,
11476 (2002) (noting Rule XX Revisions were sparked by TELC’s representation
of St. James Citizens).  Although the intent behind the Rule XX revisions is un-
clear from the text, the revisions have not denied representation to the TELC’s
clients. See id. at 11478 (stating TELC can still provide students with litigation
experience).
213. See Houck, supra note 83, at 497 (listing new restrictions court imposed
on clinics).
214. Id. (explaining how rejected rule could pose conflict of interest).
215. Id. (describing more aggressive rules that Louisiana Supreme Court
rejected).
216. Id. (explaining representation restrictions).  The Sierra Club is a na-
tional environmental organization founded in California in 1892. See About the Si-
erra Club, SIERRA CLUB, https://www.sierraclub.org/about-sierra-club?gclid=
CJ0KCQjwwr32BRD4ARIsAAJNf_1hHpnIYD4o4Pm21D3rCyuAHm__uvS2IVjoLWa
EChTMrQBn_4Vz0lEaAmauEALw_wcB (last visited June 20, 2020) (describing Si-
erra Club’s mission and history).
217. Houck, supra note 83, at 497 (describing federal poverty line as ex-
tremely low).  The working poor would be excluded from the TELC’s representa-
tion under the new rule. Id. (explaining how difficult it is for Cancer Alley citizens
to obtain representation).
218. See Id. at 498 (describing rule modifications).
219. Id. (describing adjusted poverty threshold required for representation).
220. Id. (noting how court abandoned representation restriction for nation-
ally affiliated groups).
221. Id. (describing how court relaxed rules).
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The TELC came under attack again in 2010 when Louisiana
State Senator Robert Adley introduced a bill—sponsored by the
Louisiana Chemical Association—meant to shut down the clinic.222
Senator Adley sought to prohibit law clinics at universities that re-
ceive state funding from suing government agencies.223  This bill
would have required Tulane to decide between receiving state fund-
ing or shutting down its clinic.224  Before the bill went further, the
Louisiana Senate Commerce Committee voted to kill the bill.225  Al-
though the TELC has survived multiple attacks, the controversy sur-
rounding the clinic shows how difficult it is for Cancer Alley
residents to obtain representation to contest the siting of pe-
trochemical facilities.226
V. CONCLUSION: THE CONTINUED FIGHT AGAINST THE SITING OF
PETROCHEMICAL FACILITIES IN CANCER ALLEY
With the growth of the petrochemical industry and increased
usage of petrochemical products, it is likely that both the air quality
and pollution in Cancer Alley could worsen.227  The biggest threat
to Cancer Alley residents at the moment is Formosa’s Sunshine Pro-
ject, an industrial complex of fourteen petrochemical facilities in
St. James Parish.228  The citizens of the parish are worried their
community will not survive another plant that will further pollute
their already polluted communities.229
222. CityBusiness Commentary, Opinion: Law Clinic Ban Dies a Good Death,
NEW ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS (May 20, 2010), https://neworleanscitybusiness.com/
blog/2010/05/20/opinion-law-clinic-ban-dies-a-good-death/ (reporting new un-
successful attack on TELC).
223. Id. (explaining bill’s purpose).
224. Id. (describing conundrum university would be placed in).
225. Id. (recounting how committee unanimously voted to defer bill).
226. See generally Houck, supra note 83, at 499 (stating clinic’s opponents had
taken “extremely hard swing” at clinic and missed).
227. See Gardiner, supra note 4 (predicting toxic emissions will increase world-
wide).  Currently, petrochemicals account for fourteen percent of oil use. Id. (ex-
pecting petrochemicals to drive half of oil demand growth).  Additionally, with
demand for plastic rapidly increasing, it is expected that global emissions linked to
plastic production could increase from 900 million tons per year to 1.3 billion tons
per year by 2030. See id. (anticipating plastic production will increase).  Compa-
nies are looking to create a new petrochemical corridor like Cancer Alley to ex-
pand their plastic production. Id. (listing potential candidates for new
“petrochemical hub” as Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia).
228. See Lubben, supra note 42 (describing Shintech’s new plant).
229. Id. (describing citizens’ concerns).
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Nonetheless, many Cancer Alley residents have taken this op-
portunity to unite and fight against the siting of these facilities.230
Despite being aware of how onerous their situation is, Cancer Alley
residents refuse to acquiesce to petrochemical facilities that pollute
their communities.231  A Cancer Alley resident decided to form Rise
St. James, an environmental justice group, after she noticed no gov-
ernment officials were protecting St. James from petrochemical pol-
lution.232  While the group is small and consists mostly of
volunteers, its leader, Sharon Lavigne, is quickly helping the group
gain momentum by organizing protests and marches.233
Meanwhile, the Louisiana Chemical Association (LCA) dis-
putes the existence of a connection between petrochemical facili-
ties and the high cancer rate in the region.234  The LCA has even
gone so far as calling the Cancer Alley label a myth.235  Further, the
LCA maintains that study after study has negated a connection be-
tween the petrochemical industry and cancer rates.236  Advocates
for the petrochemical industry believe the “Cancer Alley label” neg-
atively affects the “local industry’s progress and efforts to build posi-
tive relations with the community.”237
The Lake Area Industrial Alliance (LAIA), a non-profit organi-
zation made up primarily of petrochemical companies, undertook
an advertising campaign in 2007 designed to debunk the “cancer
alley myth.”238  The campaign did not have its intended effect be-
cause Cancer Alley residents continued to believe petrochemical fa-
230. See Antonia Juhasz, Louisiana’s ‘Cancer Alley’ Is Getting Even More Toxic –
But Residents Are Fighting Back, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 30, 2019, 12:59 PM), https://
www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/louisiana-cancer-alley-getting-
more-toxic-905534/ (describing how Cancer Alley residents have created environ-
mental groups).
231. See id. (explaining how some Cancer Alley residents never expected to
become activists).
232. See id. (recounting events leading to Rise St. James’s inception).  Sharon
Lavigne, RISE St. James’s founder, noticed at the public meetings on Formosa’s
industrial complex that no local officials spoke up about the pollution the com-
plex is expected to produce. Id. (describing founder’s motivations).
233. See id. (noting group has been protesting against Formosa’s industrial
complex).
234. Fighting the Cancer Alley Myth, LA. CHEMICAL ASS’N, http://www.lca.org/
resources/chemical-connections/fighting-the-cancer-alley-myth (last visited June
24, 2020) (arguing cancer rates in region are not higher than rest of country).
235. Id. (aligning with Cato Institute’s labeling of Cancer Alley as myth).
236. Id. (attempting to debunk “Cancer Alley myth”).
237. Id. (noting effects of Cancer Alley label).
238. Id. (summarizing advertising efforts undertaken).  The campaign was de-
signed to inform Cancer Alley residents that cancer rates in the region are similar
to those of the rest in the country. Id. (illustrating goals of advertising campaign).
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cilities cause cancer.239  The LAIA conducted a more aggressive
advertising campaign in 2009, recruiting doctors, hospitals, and
physician groups in Cancer Alley to inform the public of cancer
rates in the region.240  This campaign seemed to achieve its in-
tended goal as more members of the community appeared to be-
lieve cancer rates were related to lifestyle choices instead of the
petrochemical industry.241
Petrochemical companies often defend their siting decisions
by maintaining that land use laws, which already confine facilities to
predominantly African American neighborhoods, restrict zoning
boards.242  Additionally, low-income communities and communities
of color are often ideal locations “because land prices and compen-
sation costs are relatively low,” thus leading petrochemical compa-
nies to place their facilities there.243  Perhaps the most popular
arguments in favor of petrochemical facilities are that they are good
for business and that they bring jobs to areas in desperate need of
them.244  The promise of jobs has been criticized, particularly in
Cancer Alley, as local residents often hold only a small percentage
of industry jobs with the rest going to outsiders.245
Despite the petrochemical industry’s efforts, the environmen-
tal justice movement continues to gain attention and support in
Cancer Alley.246  Cancer Alley residents could leverage this atten-
tion and gain more political power by incorporating their towns—
239. Fighting the Cancer Alley Myth, supra note 234 (noting failure of first
campaign).
240. Id. (recounting steps taken in second, more aggressive campaign).
241. Id. (noting how some Cancer Alley residents switched their beliefs).
242. Mizutani, supra note 9, at 370 (arguing site selection process fails to pre-
vent discriminatory siting).
243. Saha & Mohai, supra note 18, at 619 (explaining why industrial zones
coincide with low income and minority neighborhoods).
244. See Gardiner, supra note 4 (stating petrochemical facilities are welcome
in areas affected by loss of coal industry); see also Houck, supra note 83, at 492-93
(recounting how Governor Foster and business allies claimed TELC was bad for
business in petitions filed with Louisiana Supreme Court).
245. See Houck, supra note 83, at 461-62 (stating petrochemical companies
seek outside skilled workers).
246. See generally Juhasz, supra note 230 (describing environmental justice
groups’ increased mobilization).  The environmental justice movement continues
to grow in Cancer Alley, especially in St. James, where environmental groups—like
the Sierra Club, 350 New Orleans, and Extinction Rebellion—have joined in
marches against the siting of petrochemical facilities. Id. (recounting how environ-
mental groups joined in “March Against Death Alley”).  Rise St. James members
are currently focusing their energy on battling Formosa’s Sunshine Project, which
will be located approximately one mile from an elementary school. Id. (expressing
group’s main motivations).
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just like the citizens of St. Gabriel, Louisiana did.247  Residents of
the newly incorporated towns could then make decisions regarding
the zoning and placement of petrochemical facilities in their com-
munities.248  Additionally, TELC’s success in getting Shintech to
abandon its plans to build a plant in Convent, Louisiana shows
there is hope Cancer Alley residents will be able to gain legal repre-
sentation to protect their communities from pollution.249  Until
then, Cancer Alley residents should keep up the good fight.250
Idna G. Castellón*
247. See generally Houck, supra note 83, at 479 (explaining how incorporation
led to increased political clout for parish residents).  Although petrochemical com-
panies are still trying to build plants in St. Gabriel, the community’s fierce opposi-
tion to industrial rezoning has led council officials to reject zoning requests from
petrochemical companies.  Terry L. Jones, St. Gabriel residents keeping up their fight
against chemical plant, industrial expansions, THE ADVOC. (Oct. 22, 2017, 2:30 PM),
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/communities/westside/arti-
cle_d43f5d32-b031-11e7-b345-9fe6c6ef7ba1.html (recounting how St. Gabriel re-
sidents swarmed city council’s chambers urging them to reject chemical company’s
zoning request).  In 2015, St. Gabriel residents were successful in getting the own-
ers of three thousand acres of undeveloped land to withdraw their request to re-
zone the area from residential to “heavy industrial.” Id. (explaining fierce
opposition from activist group caused owners to back out).
248. See Mizutani, supra note 9, at 373 (stating unincorporated towns lack gov-
ernance power over their own affairs).
249. See Houck, supra note 83, at 506 (noting Shintech abandoned plans to
build plant).
250. See id. at 507 (hoping one day poor Louisiana residents will rely less heav-
ily on student representation).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2021, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; B.A., Psychology, Holocaust & Genocide Studies Minor, 2016, West Chester
University of Pennsylvania.  I would like to thank my parents, Fernando and Mirla
Castellón, my sister, Jennifer Castellón, and my aunt and uncle, Idna and Bob
Corbett, for all their love and support throughout my law school career.  I would
like to dedicate this Comment to my grandfather, Samuel Castellón, for instilling
in me the activist spirit and for teaching me to always show compassion and kind-
ness to others.
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